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The Integration of Responsibility and Values: Legal
Education in an Alternative Consciousness of
Lawyering and Law
Howard Lesnick1

Howard Lesnick is one of the founding faculty members of CUNY
Law School with primary responsibility for the development of the
curriculum. He served on the University of Pennsylvania Law
School faculty for over twenty years and has visited at Berkeley,
Chicago, Columbia, Michigan, NYU, Stanford and Texas. He is
widely known for his work in labor law and in legal representation
of the poor, and is a co-author of Becoming a Lawyer: A Human
istic Perspective on Legal Education and Professionalism (1981) .

A.

Responsibility

I see the primary aim of legal education as enabling students to be
responsible in the practice of law. The core meaning of the idea of
responsibility is the recognition that the choices one makes as a lawyer
have an effect on people's lives. From this recognition flows the realiza
tion that our work as lawyers can be an affirmation, or a negation, of
our values, of the goals that we want our lives to strengthen. In my
view, the first task of a law school is to help students to explore the
fuller meaning and implications of responsibility in law practice. This is
the "understanding" aspect of learning to be responsible.
In addition, we must give students some of what they need in or
der to be responsible. Knowledge of legal doctrine and skill at lawyer-

1.

I have been working at CUNY since it began to develop a new curriculum

designed to educate students to practice with an orientation to the public interest.
What follows is an informal sketch of the central premises of the CUNY curriculum. I
am grateful to Charles Halpern, Dean of the Law School, for his confidence and sup
port in the effort to develop and implement a thorough examination of the goals, con
tent, and methods of legal education; and to John Farago and Jack Himmelstein,
faculty colleagues with whom ! worked closely in the initial planning year and whose
ideas - and, in many instances, whose language - are as deeply embedded in this
essay as they are in the CUNY program.
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ing tasks are a crucial part of what one needs to be responsible. Tradi
tional legal education tends to value this skill and knowledge in itself,
and they become the goal rather than a means toward reaching the
goal. A person needs such qualities as the ability to analyze and syn
thesize legal principles, a keen sense of relevance and procedure, and
the ability to organize and present a coherent and persuasive line of
reasoning in speech and writing. A person needs, however, far more
than these traditionally valued skills, in order to be a responsible law
yer. The "more" includes the wider range of skills associated with
clinical teaching in the narrow sense, such as interviewing prospective
clients, examining witnesses, or drafting pleadings or interrogatories,
but goes beyond them to include more qualitative skills - listening,
exercising judgment, and engaging in moral reasoning are major exam
ples - as well as matters going beyond skill, such as developing knowl
edge of oneself and of the premises of the legal and the social order.
The CUNY curriculum seeks to implement the emphasis on re
sponsibility in two major ways: first, through the emphasis on Iawyer
ing, and on the integration of lawyering with iaw; second, through the
commitment to make explicit the values dimension of law and of lawy
ering. Through these means, our hope is to enable and encourage stu
dents to interact more actively with respect to their own learning, and
to their developing identity and evolving choices regarding their work
as lawyers. Our aim is to see students as people, and to teach them to
see themselves as people. Our admissions process is designed to look for
applicants who seem open to engaging in that process, and we endeavor
to ask them to ask themselves, throughout the three years, what they
want to become as lawyers.
The centrality of responsibility, and its meaning, apply to the
School as an institution as much as to the individuals in it. The idea of
an "implicit curriculum" is that much of what we teach is transmitted
by the attitudes and practices that we model. A lot of this has to do
with the way a lawyer treats those over \vhom he or she has power.
This involves such diverse areas as the way that students experience the
School in the application process, relations of faculty and students with
the non-professional staff, and the way that people in the cases are
treated in professorial comments and class discussion.
The responsibility of the School also involves our approach to stu
dent "problems" - that is, our willingness to interact with students as
people with regard to their entire life situation, not simply the develop
ment of their minds in the courses. We have responsibility for conse
quences, such as those flowing from the cost of tuition and the contours
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of the market, even though we do not intend them. The need to provide
on-site child care is for me an aspect of this question. The placement
process is another example, both our responsibility to aid students to
find work consonant with their values, and what we say to students
about what a "good" or prestigious job is. It means little to talk about
equality and societal needs as values while reinforcing by our conduct
the widespread tendency to give people our attention - and our honors
(invitations to speak, awards, pictures on the walls) - on the basis of
prestige, titles, and authority.
The relevance of the idea of the responsibility of the institution
applies to the explicit curriculum as well. It suggests, primarily, the
shaping of each course through a commitment to purpose rather than
coverage. When I say "rather than," I recognize that there is often a
purpose to coverage: Examples are basic literacy regarding legal terms,
an awareness of historical development, even particular judges or theo
ries. In each instance, however, material needs to be presented in a
context that attempts to make a link to the purpose of the course or of
the overall program. The effort should be to overcome two kinds of
fragmentation: First, the split of law from thought, that is, seeing law
simply as doctrine, the product of reasoning or analysis; this is the em
phasis on theory. Second, the split of thought from action, seeing prac
tice simply as rather low-level cognitive or interpersonal skills, divorced
from both law and values; this is the emphasis on practice and
lawyering.
It is obviously necessary to make choices regarding subject matter
and method. In every case, however, it is important to keep asking why
a certain thing is proposed to be taught, or taught in a certain way, or
to a certain extent, or with something else, and then to ask why again
about the reason given as an answer. The purpose of asking why is to
enable us to become aware of the premises and priorities that trigger
our choices, so that we can make responsible decisions about them.
That process might change our choice, or shape it in a new way, or
lead us to reaffirm it.
Consider, as a subject-matter example, the question whether the
lease is a conveyance of an interest in land or is a contract. That can be
taught to illustrate the force of history in the evolution of doctrine. It
can also be taught to illustrate the instrumental landlholder-orientation
of the common law. It can be taught as a lesson in realism, to empha
size that the perception of what a lease "is" is a normative, not a de
scriptive, process. I find it attractive - and this may be only a further
development of the realist purpose

-

as a way of teaching the legiti-
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mating quality of legal concepts: Calling a lease a conveyance, and
teaching about it in Property (separate from Contracts), reinforces the
idea that it is just for the tenant to bear the risk of loss, since, after all,
the subject of the sale, the leasehold, is still the tenant's. The sharp
political change that has given rise in many jurisdictions to the "war
ranty of habitability" is no more a logical result than the former one.
Using the term "warranty of habitability" makes the landlord seem
like a welsher, for not delivering on a promise, and facilitates the con
clusion, which now seems right to many of us, that it is just for the
landlord to bear the risk of loss. The function of legal reasoning, there
fore, is to make it seem logical and, indeed, inexorable, that one result
(or the other) be reached. The existence of choice is unmasked by pen
etrating the legal concept and seeing it as a construct that facilitates a
particular result. For me, teaching the issue for that purpose is particu
larly salient, for it reinforces the idea of unperceived choice, which is at
the core of both legal regulation and law practice.
A similar process applies with respect to methods of teaching. One
may favor a problem/simulation/clinical emphasis on the ground that
lawyers need to learn the skills of witness preparation, cross examina
tion, and the like. I would then ask why they need to learn it, and learn
it in law school, and whether we want at the same time to avoid having
them learn other things that go along with learning those

skills as

skills. That process for me leads to a somewhat broader answer (which
still has the acquisition of skills as an important goal): Putting students
in role repeatedly is intended to evoke a desire on their part to under
stand subject matter, including the subject matter of doctrine as much
as the subject matter of forensic skills. More broadly, it rests on the
notion that application is a critical part of what it means to understand
subject matter, that in a real sense one cannot anderstand law separate
from its application. Finally, it rests on the belief that only by exper
iencing a role can students learn to exercise choice about its place in
their practice. These purposes would surely lead one to include a
clinical focus, but its content and method would be shaped by one's
objectives.

B.

The Traditional Consciousness of Law and Lawyering

The foregoing discussion, in my view, illustrates the recurrent need
to "step back" from content sufficiently to be able to understand the
assumptions underlying that content, and the implications of it. One
may step back, as above, in order to look at purpose. Stepping back
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also permits a look at an overall framework or consciousness. By the
word "consciousness," I mean a set of mutually reinforcing premises,
priorities, or perceptions, which are for the most part either implicit or
axiomatic. 2
Many of us experience important dissatisfactions with central as
pects of law, lawyering and legal education, and the last two decades
have witnessed the emergence of a number of "alternative" structures
that tap this dissatisfaction. In practice, the public interest law firm,
law collectives, and the practice of mediation are examples; in law, le
gal realism, Iaw reform, and critical legal theory; in legal education,
the clinical education and humanistic education "movements". Each of
these responses, while achieving important change, has often suc
cumbed to two related dangers: First, they are marginalized, seen as
something apart from the mainstream world of law and law practice.
They tell a student, teacher or practitioner that, unless he or she aban
dons the traditional route entirely - becoming a mediator, public in
terest lawyer, community organizer, or leaving "the law" entirely the traditional rules remain in force. Second, there is a strong tendency
for alternative structures to pick up the underlying framework, and
come more and more to look like what was left behind. The struggle of
public interest and legal service Iawyers over issues of accountability to
clients is an example. My premise is that there

is a consciousness that

underlies the traditional framework and influences our actions, even
when they are an explicit expression of dissatisfaction with central as
pects of that framework. Unless that consciousness is made explicit, it
cannot be made the subject of choice, and choice cannot be exercised at
a level sufficiently fundamental to implement the impulse that may
have generated it.
The central characteristic of the traditional consciousness of lawy
ering is the primacy of role, whether it is the role of attorney, student,
or teacher.3 Answers are determined a

priori, by large categories of

situations: "As a lawyer, . . . ;" "as an associate, . . . ;" even "as a
radical. . . . " The concept of role is premised on the denial of respon
sibility; it sees the impact of one's work on people as the responsibility
of the system as a whole, and not of the individual lawyer. It is impor-

2.
Law,

See Lesnick, The Consciousness of Work and the Values of American Labor

32 BUFF. L REv. 833, 84 1-43 ( 1983).
3.

Among the many analyses and critiques that have appeared

in

the past dec

ade, I find most helpful one of the earliest: Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals:

Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS I

( 1975).
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tant to recognize and acknowledge that it is often real pressures, real
problems, real needs that give rise to the role definition; the answer,
however, comes to be taken for granted in new situations without a new
connection to the underlying need or function. For example: "As an
advocate, I don't worry about what happens to my client's adversary
because of his or her lawyer's incompetence." The problem of taking in
the "enemy" as a person is an extremely agonizing one in many situa
tions - we could not practice law without some recognition of this
message - and the concept of role tells us that we are not involved in
that process. In the traditional consciousness, the rightness of the ob
jectification of the adversary is viewed as self-evident, and not to be
reappraised in particular cases.4
The traditional consciousness sees iaw as rules promulgated by
some accepted source, and applied through a process of reasoning in a
general, impersonal, procedurally fair way. The aim is to restrain and
regularize power over individuals by defining spheres of rights and du
ties, within which each of us may pursue his or her own ends. lt is for
this reason that the emphasis is on adjudication; the determination of
fault is the premise of finding that one has invaded another's rights.
The traditional consciousness rests on an underlying value system
that shapes and is reinforced by it. First, it manifests a view of the
world as one of scarcity, populated by self-aggrandizing, competing in
dividuals, each having subjective and arbitrary desires, and character
ized by their awareness of separateness from one another. Second, it
emphasizes achievement, energy and mastery. In this value system,
government's legitimate concern is with the preservation of peace and
order; it is both the primary source of oppression and - through its
creature, the law- the primary protection against oppression. Auton
omy is equated with "being left alon�," and t he function of society is
seen as to provide a system of mutually beneficial exchanges among
individuais. Justice tends to be regarded as the natural product of
transactions among individuals (a market or process view of justice),
and the dominant social order as iegitimate and presumptively just.

4.

A uniquely powerful statement of this phenomenon is Mark Twain's THE

WAR PRAYER. See Gary Friedman's and my comments, in E. DvoRKI01. BECOMING A
LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE

ON

LEGAL EDUCATION

202-07 ( 1981) [hereinafter cited as Becoming

a

Lawyer].

AND

PROFESSIONALISM
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Equalitarian work place, respectful of people as individuals

This consciousness embodies much that we value: The notion of
the rule of law as a restraint on discretion and a limitation on arbitrary
power, the unleashing of individual energy and diversity, the respect for
fair procedure as an independent value. The problem is the partial
quality of the traditional consciousness. To summarize with egregious
brevity: First, procedure is not all that we care about. Second, the cer
tainty and impartiality suggested by the traditional notion has over and
over been proven illusory. The legal realist critique made clear long ago
that there is choice, most particulary when it is being denied by legal
formalism; the clear implication- which there is a strong tendency to
shrink from making, or adhering to - is that the attempt to separate
law from politics is illusory at best, and a mystification. Third, the illu
sion of certainty does not simply mean that results are capricious (in
the sense suggested by the legendary realist concern over what the
judge had for breakfast) . The rules transmit existing power arrange
ments. Rules, language, and the process of fact-finding, are inherently
indeterminate, and emotions and values fuel adjudication as well as
legislation.

C.

Polarities and Synthesis: Approaching an "Alternative
Consciousness"

In looking at what an alternative consciousness might be, it is im
portant to begin by considering explicitly the tendency to express a re
jection of the traditional in polar terms. What is wrong with the tradi
tional

consciousness

is

that

it

is

incomplete,

that

it

becomes

a
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caricature of reality, a caricature of the human personality. I t seeks to
protect certain values that are generally important - individual self
expression, for example- and is unwilling to respect other values out
of a fear that that can be done only at the cost of the first set. An
example- drawn from legal education rather than lawyering- is the
widespread resistance to clinical education based on an asserted fear of
an abandonment of "rigor" in intellectual analysis. Upon realizing the
limited nature of the traditional consciousness, it is easy to react by
becoming caught in its polar opposite, which, although fashioned on
opposite values than the traditional, is similarly unidimensional and
partial. So, teachers drawn to clinical education often find themselves
denying that intellectual rigor has substantial positive value.
A non-polar alternative consciousness seeks to incorporate the
traditional in a broader view, holding to what is worth holding to, but
insisting on a more situational consideration of consequences and the
possibility of respecting the aims of apparently inconsistent values. The
hoary academic debate, between rigor and values or intellect and emo
tion in studying cases, is a classic example of this polarized form of
thinking. We are usually required to decide which pole repels us the
most, so that we can cling desperately to the opposite one. Rigor and
values are conflicting only from a linear perspective; in "rejecting"
rigor, '>ve are rejecting only the claim of completeness for it, in order to
seek a broader value, one that includes rigor and includes values as
well.5
An alternative consciousness of lawyering expresses a view that at
tempts to go beyond both the traditional adversary consciousness and a
polar rejection of it. The central theme is not the rejection of role, but
a dynamic relation between role and self, which involves an interaction
among awareness of choice, responsibility for choice, and values.
Legal thinking has barely begun to articulate the content of a gen
uinely alternative consciousness of law. The prevailing legal responses
to date have accepted much of the critique of traditional consciousness,
but have refused or failed to foilow the implications of that critique.
The widespread attempt to discover values that are shared in the com
munity recognizes that it is a value system, and not a process of rea
soning, that is at work. Yet, following Holmes' example - the true
inputs are the "felt necessities of the time" - approaches as disparate
as Hart & Sacks in the 1950's, Ronald Dworkin, and much of the Law

5.

See E. DvORKIN. supra note 4, at i59-74.
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and Economic movement today, regard the significant values as more
or less inherent, whether discoverable through economic analysis, "rea
soned elaboration," intuition, or revelation. These approaches are being
seriously challenged by critical legal theory, which sees them as legiti
mation mechanisms, that rationalize and justify domination, in part by
hiding it, and that, to a greater or lesser degree, continue to define
"societal needs" in a way that is responsive to such values as productiv
ity, hierarchy and the mobility of capital.6
The central elements of an alternative consciousness of law seem
to me to be: a) seeing law in terms of the values underlying the rule
rather than the rule itself - "The Jetter killeth, but the Spirit giveth
life;" b) seeing justice as responsive to human needs, in the sense of the
concrete reality of people's lives, to outcomes as well as process; c) see
ing human needs in a way that is not fully captured by the notion of
rights and duties, that is more interactive. The appropriateness of me
diation (rather than adjudication) as a means of processing some im
portant differences among people in this consciousness is simply that it
is a procedure that has the potential to respond to what becomes
important.

D.

The Integration of Responsibility and Values

To teach students what it means to be responsible is to attempt to
empower to do so those who would choose to do so. That effort is im
portantly different from teaching students that they

ought to be respon

sible, in a way that bears on the central question whether the emphasis
on responsibility has any values impiication. To the extent that it does
not - that it is simply asking people to act out of authenticity, in
congruence with their own values, whatever they may be - it seems
woefully incomplete, and oriented only to a narrow form of personal
fulfillment. To the extent that there is substantive values content in the
idea of responsibility, there is concern, first, that the content is being
left unexpressed and, second, that its legitimacy is open to question and
that students are being manipulated or indoctrinated in an institution
ally determined value orthodoxy.
My hypothesis is that a fully developed concept of responsibility
can resolve the dilemma between these two poles, that the idea of re-

·6.

See, e.g., Robert Gordon's luminous essay, New Developments in Legal The

ory, in D. KAIRYS, THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281, 286-90

( 1982).
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sponsibility is far more demanding than it is often viewed, that it has
values content in a way that respects individual choice.
The theoretical framework that supports the effort to find non-po
larized ways of thinking about problems is helpful in penetrating the
question of the link between responsibility and values. Our tendency is
to see the choice as polar. Either responsibility is the key, or values are.
Either there is a values content to responsibility, or there is not. I n both
dilemmas, each pole has serious flaws. Our task is the dual one of con
tinuing to attempt to articulate what a synthesis would look like, and
continuing to discern how as teachers we can move and help our stu
dents to move toward it. Our students experience the dilemma as we
do. Some oscillate between the poles, others hold firmly to one out of
fear of falling into the other. The dilemma, and the attempt to move
beyond it, mirror that of the traditional and anti-traditional conscious
ness, including the fact we are only at the beginning of the process of
finding meaningful alternatives. I ndeed, the polar ways of experiencing
values and responsibility is tied up with the pervasive reach and power
of the traditional consciousness.7
The dilemma is often posed in a static way: Suppose a student tells
you that he or she is in law school simply to learn the rules, get the
certificate, and head out to become a "happy rich person." Do you kick
the student out, write him or her off as free to do it but bound for hell,
or adopt some other unhappy variation on either oppression or surren
der? My response is that we continually invite the student to engage
with us over his or her choice, its implications, and the decision to take
responsibility for it. If we continually ask students to take responsibil
ity, do it over time, ask them to interact with one another and with the
question, I believe that the idea of responsibility will be seen as increas
ingly demanding, in ways that do not simply leave each of us free to
pick our own values and tell everyone else to mind their business. As
the student (as each of us) does that, we come into touch with our
connection with others: not as a role, not as a moral imperative, not as
political pressure - and not in the same way for all - but as an au
thentic part of us. Once that happens to me (as student or teacher), I
can choose to put the realization aside, not act on it. However, it is now
partly me that I am putting aside, and if the question keeps coming up,
in an endless variety of ways, it has to be continually put aside.
Once our connection with others is acted on rather than put aside,

7.

See

Delaney, Towards a Human Rights Theory of Criminal Law: A Human
6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 831 (1978).

istic Perspective,

1986]

Lesnick

643

even in a minor context, there has been an important shift, which
makes new shifts possible. Experiencing choice where it did not seem to
exist before makes it more readily seem to exist the next time.8 This
process is not linear, and in some individuals will never take hold. But
that is not to say that it does not have enormous significance, looking at
a group of 150 people over three years. And overall the shift has a
values content, it is not simply that each of us becomes more himself or
herself, whatever that may happen to be. In our society, there is a sys
tematic strengthening of some parts of the self as we grow up, and a
systematic weakening of others, and the process of taking responsibility
and becoming more fully oneself strengthens the delegitimated parts.
They tend to be the values of the alternative consciousness: the empha
sis on equality, on relationship, on caring.
In beginning to explore how to move towards a synthesis between
values and responsibility, we need to proceed from the recognition that
either divorced from the other becomes empty. The question for us as
teachers is how to put out to students what we believe, about values

and about responsibility. The choice is often expressed in too narrow a
way: Do we "come out" with our values or do we keep them to our
selves? The notion of sharing our values, rather than imposing them,
means for me that we come out, and do it in a way that is inclusive and
not hierarchical. A teacher's expression of values can easily be accepted
(or rejected) by students more as the result of the teacher-student dy
namic than of any sense of the student's evolving sense of self. "Val
ues" can themselves become akin to a role. It is difficult to apply all of
this, particularly in a classroom environment where the students are in
conflict and tension.9 Many left-oriented teachers express their values
-when they do- in ways that are intended to empower students who
feel delegitimated by the prevailing environment. That can succeed,
and at the same time disempower others who may disagree, or be
frightened of the emotive words used or of the implications for their
relations with people they care about.
Responsibility, values, and their interaction obviously involve fun
damental concerns and life choices that go beyond the immediate ques
tion whether and how as teachers we "cop" to our values. They are
present in our approach to placement, in the students' choices of work
within any work setting, and in our work together in building the insti-

8.

See my comment in E. DvoRKII'. supra note 4, at 132-133.

9.

See Lesnick, Reassessing Law Schooling: The Sterling Forest Group,

NYU. L REv. 565, 567-69 (1978).
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tution of which we are a part. An inclusive way of sharing values is
possible, however ably done in the classroom, only in an overall learn
ing context that is egalitarian and honors students as people.

